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Abstract: China has enacted and enforced 70-more internet-regulation related 
pieces of laws and regulations, and the so-called ‘real name registration’ 
scheme is to be implemented by the end of June 2014. To date, China has 
established comprehensive legal framework and sophisticated multi-level  
law enforcement mechanism to regulate the contents on internet. This paper 
undertakes an economic analysis of the internet contents regulation in China, 
aiming to find out a possible answer to the question of whether the current 
regulation regime in China on internet contents is cost-effective, feasible and 
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paper makes submissions to policy and law makers accordingly. 
Keywords: economic analysis; internet regulation; policy; law; China. 
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Liao, Z. (2016)  
‘An economic analysis on internet regulation in China and proposals to  
policy and law makers’, Int. J. Technology Policy and Law, Vol. 2, Nos. 2/3/4, 
pp.242–256. 
Biographical notes: Zhixiong Liao has practised law in China, both in public 
sectors and in private law firms, since 1996, specialised in commercial law, 
overseas investment and tax law, with some Hong Kong listed companies, 
Fortune-500 subsidiaries and local tax departments as his clients. He was 
admitted as a Barrister and Solicitor of New Zealand High Court and practised 
commercial/property law in Auckland law firms before joining the Faculty of 
Law. He is also a member of the New Zealand Society of Translators and 
Interpreters, specialised in legal translation. His main research interests are 
contract/commercial law and business regulation. 
 
1 Introduction 
China has enacted and enforced 70-more internet-regulation related pieces of laws and 
regulations (Liao, 2015), and the so-called ‘real name registration’ scheme is to be 
implemented by the end of June 2014 (State Council Office, 2014). To date, China has 
established comprehensive legal framework and sophisticated multi-level law 
enforcement mechanism to regulate the contents on internet. A number of 
levels/measures of law enforcement are employed by the Chinese Government to regulate 
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the internet in China, namely, content restrictions; licensing requirements; liability 
imposed on ISPs and ICPs; registration requirements of IP address, user ID and account; 
self-regulation coupled with online surveillance, liabilities imposed on internet users; 
technical measures and human censorship. Presumably, policy makers, lawmakers, and 
netizens, whether within China or not, are interested in knowing whether such this legal 
framework and law enforcement mechanism are cost-effective, and whether the current 
internet content regulation regime in China as a whole is maintainable and justifiable 
from an ‘economic’ point of view, and whether the on-coming ‘real name registration’ 
scheme will substantially change the answers to those questions. This paper attempts to 
do an economic analysis on China’s current internet content regulation regime and based 
on the findings makes submissions to policy and law makers accordingly. 
Although an ‘economic’ analysis, it is unlikely to be a quantitative research in a strict 
sense. Rather, this paper adopts a substantially qualitative approach by observation and 
comparison of the ‘effects’ and ‘costs’ of the current internet content regulation regime in 
China. By the term ‘effect’, this paper refers to the ‘positive’ effects brought by the 
internet regulation, mainly the desired effects from the regulators’ standpoint, and the 
benefits brought to the society.1 The term ‘cost’ covers both the direct costs and indirect 
costs. Direct costs represent the costs incurred for the purpose of, and in the course of, the 
establishment and implementation of the internet regulation. Indirect costs represent the 
costs that are resulted from the internet regulation in China, i.e., the ‘negative effects’ 
resulted from the regulation (Liao, 2004). In some circumstances, ‘effect’ and ‘cost’ 
could be interchangeable, for example, some effects desired by regulator (the Chinese 
policy and law maker) could be a cost to netizens and the international community. These 
are the starting points of this analysis. 
2 Internet architecture and its implications for internet content regulation 
Any governmental regulation of an industry has its effects and costs and the internet 
content regulation in China is of no exception. However, because of the uniqueness of the 
internet architecture and the sophisticated nature of the internet regulation in China, in 
evaluating the effects and costs of China’s current internet content regulation regime, two 
factors must be taken into account. One is China’s basic attitudes towards the internet  
and the goals of its internet regulation. The other is the internet architecture and its 
implications for the regulation of internet content. 
One might argue that there is no real difference between the regulations of the 
contents on the internet and the contents communicated through other forms of media, 
because the focus of the regulation is the content being communicated rather than the 
means of communication. It is true that the internet is one of many ways to communicate 
and disseminate information. If the only role of the internet were to substitute for other 
communication media, the problems for the content regulation would have no real 
difference between the internet and other forms of media. However, the infrastructure or 
architecture of the internet is so unique or so different from other forms of media that the 
internet does pose different problems to the internet content regulators (Solum, 2009). 
There are some ideas/theories proposed in relation to the internet architecture  
(or the distinctive character of the internet) and its implications for internet regulation, for 
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example, the code thesis, the end-to-end principle and the layers principle. These 
theories/ideas provide frameworks for analysing internet regulation. 
The code thesis claims that the nature of the internet or cyberspace is determined by 
the code – the software and hardware that implements the internet; therefore, the code is 
the primary regulator in cyberspace (Lessig, 1999; Solum and Chung, 2004). Internet 
cannot be regulated by national governments because the internet is a global network of 
networks, and activity on the internet can originate in any physical location in the world 
(Hughes, 2003). 
The end-to-end principle argues that the primary characteristic of the internet 
architecture that enables innovation is the end-to-end principle, i.e., to keep intelligence 
in a network at the ends or in the applications, leaving the network itself relatively simple 
(Id). This principle calls for a ‘stupid network’ and ‘smart applications’ (Solum and 
Chung, 2004). The network simply forwards or routes the data packets and does not 
discriminate traffic generated by different applications (id). 
Solum and Chung (2004) proposed the ‘layers principle’ based on the layers analysis 
of the internet. Layers analysis is based on the notion that the internet has been 
engineered through the use of layers and respecting the integrity of the layers is a 
‘fundamental principle’ of internet design (Id, p.820). The six layers that constitute the 
internet are (Id): 
• the content layer – the symbols and images that are communicated 
• the application layer – the programs that use the internet, e.g., the web 
• the transport layer – TCP, which breaks the data into packets 
• the internet protocol (IP) layer – handles the flow of data over the network 
• the link layer – the interface between users’ computers and the physical layer 
• the physical layer – the copper wire, optical cable, wireless devices, routers, etc. 
Layers analysis explains the process of the communication via the internet  
(Id, pp.816–817): 
“The layers are organized in a vertical hierarchy. When information is 
communicated via the internet, the information flows down from the content 
layer (the “highest” layer) through the application, transport, IP, and link layers 
to the physical layer (the “lowest” level); across the physical layer in packets; 
and then flows back up through the same layers in reverse order. 
Communication on the internet requires that content be digitalized by an 
application, and that the digital information be broken into packets by the 
transport layer and addressed by the internet protocol layer so that it can be 
passed on by the link layer to the physical layer. Having reached the bottom 
layer, information then moves horizontally. The physical layer transmits the 
individual data packets by copper, fiber and/or radio by various waypoints to an 
endpoint or destination on the network. Once at its destination, the information 
then ascends vertically through the layers to be interpreted by an application as 
content.” 
Based on the layers analysis, the ‘layers principle’ argues that layers are the key and 
central characteristic of the internet architecture and the legal regulation of the internet 
should be governed by the layers principle: the law should respect the integrity of layered 
Intent architecture (Id, pp.815 and 835). The layers principle has two corollaries. The first 
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is the principle of layer separation: internet regulation should not violate or compromise 
the separation between layers designed into the basic architecture of the internet. The 
second is the principle of minimising layer crossing: minimising the distance between the 
layer at which the law aims to produce an effect and the layer that is directly affected by 
legal regulation. The layer principle has obvious implications for the evaluation of 
internet regulations. The best regulations attack a problem at a given layer with a 
regulation at that layer; whereas the worst regulations attack a problem at the content 
layer by imposing a regulation at the physical layer – or vice versa (Id, pp.817–818). 
The unique architecture of the internet suggests that the most fundamental nature of 
the internet is freedom and any governmental regulation on the internet will be largely 
futile and vain. If a government does insist on regulating the internet, different methods 
of regulation could have huge difference regarding the effects and costs resulted. 
3 The effect of the internet content regulation in China 
The evaluation of the effect of a governmental regulation must take into account the 
policy goals of the regulation. Generally, government regulation applies to an industry 
where ‘market failure’ would be resulted from the problems of natural monopoly, 
imbalance of information/bargaining power or external effects. The main policy goals in 
this situation are the promotion of effective competition and the protection of consumers’ 
rights (Liao, 2004). This is the sort of regulations for economic reasons, which are more 
acceptable or to be deemed justifiable. However, a government regulation may also be 
implemented for political, social, cultural or other reasons (Id). As the huge differences in 
these areas exist in different countries, such kind of regulations is more likely to be 
controversial and to be criticised than regulations justified by economic reasons. 
China’s Government welcomes the internet because of the increased and increasing 
opportunity for economic development and the potential for China to become a global 
leader in e-commerce (Gao, 2004). However, the development of the internet in China 
also poses problems to the government because China wants to maintain the Chinese 
Communists Party (CCP) leadership and the socialist regime (Merrington, 2008; Cullen 
and Choy, 2005). Therefore, China’s Government has two concurrent goals: to utilise the 
internet for its economic development on one hand; and to limit the citizen’s ability to 
access (and put online) information that may be detriment to the CCP’s regime on the 
other (Cullen and Choy, 2005; McGeary, 2001). 
One may then ask – Has China’s internet regulation achieved these goals? Leaving 
aside the issues concerning the costs and/or negative effects of its internet regulation, it 
can be said that China’s Government has achieved both of these goals to a large extent. 
First, the rapid development and the prevalence of the internet in China demonstrate that 
China has been utilising the internet in furtherance of its economic growth. Although 
restrictions have been cited as a major obstacle to the development of the internet in 
China (McGeary, 2001), as a matter of fact, the internet in China is developing very fast 
and more and more Chinese citizens are using the internet for a wide range of purposes. 
By the end of 2013, China leads the world with internet users of 618 million and internet 
is widely used in business, research and citizen’s daily life (CNNIC, 2014a). 
Secondly, it is an undeniable fact that most Chinese citizens are precluded from 
accessing prohibited information via the internet, and that few prohibited contents are 
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produced inside the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the internet. This shows that 
China’s Governmental control over the internet contents in China is basically effective. It 
is true that the filtering system may not be completely effective for the problem of  
under-inclusion arises from the layer-violations of the blocking. It is also true that a 
savvy user can break through the filtering system and access prohibited information by 
employing technological means (Stieglitz, 2007). These factors show that the internet 
regulation in China has not been successful in completely restricting undesirable 
conducts and contents from the government’s stand points ((McGeary, 2001). However, 
this does not significantly negate the real impact of the regulation on the populace. Most 
Chinese citizens do comply with the regulation and do not try to access or publish online 
the prohibited information. The compliance of Yahoo and Google with Chinese 
regulation in previous years shows that China is successfully restricting access to the 
internet through a combination of technology, law, and citizen education (Zittrain and 
Edelman, 2003). Judged from the Chinese Government’s point of view and leaving aside 
the negative effects, the internet regulation in China is largely effective. It has been 
commented that China’s internet regulation is “the most sophisticated and effective” 
[Bambauer, (2006), p.56]. 
It is hard to estimate precisely what the benefits are brought to the society by the 
internet regulation in China. The Chinese Government may argue that the internet 
regulation help to maintain the social stability which benefits Chinese citizens and 
enterprises, and that the control of online pornography and online gambling helps to 
protect the internet users who are vulnerable to such kinds of social ills. 
In relation to the effects of a specific law enforcement mechanism of the internet 
regulation in China, it seems that different mechanisms produce different effects. For 
instance, the licensing and registration requirements seem to be very effective to control 
the internet service providers (ISPs), internet content providers (ICPs) and to force the 
internet users to self-regulate their online behaviours. The technical measures (such as the 
filtering at the gateways), however, do not satisfactorily stop the targeted internet users 
from accessing prohibited contents. On one hand, average internet users in China may not 
even care about whether a Falun Gong or pro-Tibet website is accessible to them or not 
so the blocking is meaningless or unnecessary for them; on the other hand, an internet 
user who wants to access those contents can easily break through the blocking by using 
proxy servers or other technical tools, which effectively defeats the regulator’s objective 
of putting up the blockades. The different effects produced by different mechanisms may 
be clearly explained by the application of the layers analysis proposed by Solum and 
Chung (2004). By imposing the liability upon delinquent internet users, users refrain 
from accessing and/or producing the prohibited contents, this is a mechanism that the 
layer at which the law aims to produce an effect and the layer that is directly affected by 
legal regulation are at the same layer (content layer), which follows the first corollary of 
the layers principle. Whereas in the circumstances where technologies blocking the IP 
address, domain name system (DNS), and uniform resource locator (URL) are used, the 
directly affected layer is not the targeted layer – the content layer itself, the effect of the 
regulation will be compromised to some extent depending on the ‘distance’ between the 
layer at which the law aims to produce an effect and the layer that is directly affected by 
the technical measures. Human censorship and internet users self-monitoring are the law 
enforcement mechanisms that interfere the least with the key characteristic of the internet 
architecture – the layers architecture as proposed by Solum and Chung (2004). In this 
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sense, they are the most effective and accurate ways of implementing the censorship laws 
and regulations. 
4 Costs of the internet content regulation in China 
4.1 Direct costs 
The direct costs incurred for the purpose of, and in the course of, the internet regulation 
in China include the resources put in by the Chinese Government, the ISPs and ICPs, and 
other internet-related business operators. 
In order to achieve its goals of internet regulation, the Chinese Government has 
invested a large amount of resources into the regulation. These include the cost of  
law-making for the purpose of the internet regulation and the cost of law enforcement in 
the course of the internet regulation. China has established a comprehensive legal  
system and multi-level enforcement mechanisms for internet regulation (Liao, 2015). The 
comprehensive legislation for internet regulation consists of more than 70 pieces of 
statutes and regulations concerning the internet regulation (Liao, 2015). It is conceivable 
that the cost of the establishing of the legal framework and the cost of the making of each 
law/regulation are tremendous, which at least include the costs of law-making plan, 
collection of relevant information, drafting of the law/regulation, public submission and 
hearing (some), revision of the draft and passing of the law/regulation. 
The direct costs incurred in the course of implementation of the internet regulation in 
China are even much more significant than the costs incurred at the law-making stage.2 
First, the publication and dissemination of the law/regulation incur expenditure. A law 
must be known to the employees of the law enforcement agencies and the internet users 
and relevant ISPs and ICPs in order to be effective in the real world. In order for the 
employees of the internet regulation agencies and/or the ICPs and ISPs to be familiar 
with the up-to-date government regulations, ongoing training will be invariably required. 
Secondly, the government must establish regulatory agencies and hire government 
employees in order to effective the regulation system, which generates tremendous 
administrative costs. For example, internet surveillance divisions in charge of the internet 
content surveillance were set up under the Ministry of Public Security and local public 
security authorities, which employ a cyber-police squads specifically dealing with 
‘internet crimes’. Cherry (2005) estimates that the Chinese Government employs an 
internet police force with between 30,000 and 50,000 members. As the regulations 
impose the licensing requirements on ISPs, ICPs and internet Café operators, there must 
be other well-trained government officials to handle the assessment of the applications 
and to make decisions. The surveillance of the online contents and the registration of 
basic information (e.g., ID, IP addresses, locations of businesses and servers) of internet 
users and internet business operators also require human resources. Thirdly, the hardware 
and software used for the internet content filtering are expensive and must be replaced or 
updated from time to time. It is reported that the Golden Shield Project has cost 
RMB3.712 billion until 2010 (Legal Daily, 2010). Recently, a local police office in 
Wenzhou City applied for RMB149,000 Yuan for purchasing of Trojan virus for the 
interference with mobile network use (Chen, 2015). Fourthly, the ISPs, ICPs and internet 
café operators must put in a considerable amount of resources (investment in equipment, 
software and human resources, etc.) to comply with the internet regulation requirements 
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including to discover, filter, stop transmission and report to regulatory bodies the 
‘sensitive information’. The annual assessments and renewal of internet license process 
costs both the government agencies and the internet-related businesses. 
It should also be noted that all of the direct costs stated above are social costs rather 
than individual costs. Social cost is the net loss of social wealth whereas individual cost is 
cost to some members of the society but benefit to the others and hence is simply a re-
distribution of the social wealth (Liao, 2004). 
4.2 Indirect costs 
The indirect costs are the negative effects resulted from the internet regulation in China. 
These costs include the cost of the Chinese internet users’ rights and the loss of efficiency 
of the internet. 
The restriction of Chinese netizens’ rights is obvious. If there were no such a 
regulation, Chinese citizens would have the right to access any information widely 
available on the internet; they would also have more freedom of speech online. For fear 
of being punished by the government or for the technical filtering system installed, they 
refrain from doing or are not able (not as easily as it should have been) to do what they 
should have been entitled to do (Liao, 2015). 
The other indirect cost is the loss of efficiency of the internet resulted from the 
regulation. Not only the internet users within China, but also those in the rest of the world 
have to bear the loss. This is a reasonable and logical inference from the impact of the 
governmental regulation on the architecture of the internet. 
Applying the layers principle on the internet architecture, we can see the internet 
regulation in China results in the loss of efficiency of the internet in many aspects. First, 
it is more difficult for the internet users in China to assess the information they need, 
including not only the prohibited contents, but also other information. This is because the 
cross-layered regulation impact substantial innocent uses for the so-called ‘over-breadth’ 
[Solum and Chung, (2004), p.819] problem. For example, the author, with a group of 
Waikato Law students, while staying in China in December 2014, experienced 
tremendous difficulties in using the University of Waikato’s Google-based email and 
other online systems, which resulted in normal academic and business activities 
extremely tiresome. In addition, the filtering system decreases the speed of data 
transmission in and out the PRC because routers are not designed to block IP addresses or 
websites (McGeary, 2001) and the information has to pass through the limited number of 
gateways. For these reasons, internet users in China suffer loss of efficiency resulted 
from the filtering system. 
Secondly, the centralised topology of the internet infrastructure in China is 
inconsistent with one of the basic ideas of the architecture of the internet – the packet 
switched network. Information (e.g., a PDF document, or an application) is broken into a 
large amounts of packets (each of the size of 200 kB) and packets are transmitted through 
routers in a hop-by-hop way (Solum and Chung, 2004). As the internet in China  
form a part of the whole internet, even if the destination of the delivery of information 
(e.g., a PDF document) is not within China, some of the packets may still pass through 
the internet in China. However, given that the centralised topology of the internet 
infrastructure in China keeps the network in China connected to only a limited number of 
gateways and filtering systems are installed at the gateways, it becomes harder and 
slower for any packets to pass through the internet network in China than otherwise. 
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Worse still, because of the filtering system, users outside China cannot use millions of 
routers used inside China (Id). Packets may also be dropped outside the gateways even 
though the destination of the packet is outside China (Id). 
Thirdly, the filtering system installed in China undermines the transparency of the 
whole internet. The internet simply transmits the capsulated packets without 
discrimination based on what the contents are. Transparency or non-discrimination of the 
internet enables anyone to transmit information including application software on the 
internet without bureaucracy. For this reason, the internet creates an environment 
conducive to innovation at a very low cost. Layer-violating regulations inherently 
undermine the transparency of the internet, and as a result, it increases the cost of 
innovation (Id). 
5 Implications of the ‘real name registration’ on the cost-effectiveness 
By the so-called ‘real name registration’ regime, Chinese Government imposes on 
internet-related business operators the obligation to request and register evidence of the 
‘true identity’ of internet users in China.3 The implementation of this regime will make 
Chinese Government’s internet content regulation more effective from its own point of 
view. First, ‘real name registration’ will render the investigation of violators of internet 
related laws and regulations easier and hence lower the cost incurred in investigation and 
prosecution. Secondly, the ‘real name registration’ will frighten Chinese netizens and 
deter them from breach of the laws and regulations on internet contents. Lower cost for 
investigation and prosecution generally means law breakers are more likely to be actually 
punished. Thirdly, as the Chinese Government argues, the ‘real name registration’ of 
internet users will result in a more effective of protection of personal information and 
privacy of citizens (Cui et al., 2012). 
On the other hand, however, the law/regulation making and enforcement of the  
‘real name regulation’ regime have some direct costs. In order to provide a high level 
legal authority of the regime, China’s legislature, the National People’s Congress 
Standing Committee (NPC Standing Committee, 2012) passed a statute titled ‘Decisions 
on strengthening the protection of network information’. There should have been general 
costs incurred in the making of this statute. In addition, the Ministry of Industry and 
Information, National Office of internet Information and Ministry of Public Security are 
required to make detailed regulations and implement the ‘real name registration’  
(State Council Office, 2013), which inevitably result in costs in the making and 
enforcement of the regulations. ISPs, ICPs and internet users in China will also have to 
bear direct costs – compliance costs. 
The ‘real name registration’ is a ‘one stone, two birds’ scheme (Liao, 2015). It could 
also be argued that while the ‘real name registration’ may reduce the overall direct cost of 
the enforcement of the laws and regulations on internet contents in China and may bring 
some ‘positive effects’ in protection of privacy and personal information, the tightening 
up of the control of the internet content may also result in considerable indirect cost – the 
net loss of netizens’ benefit in two aspects, namely, Chinese netizens’ freedom of 
expression is further restricted, and the global community is less likely to share 
information and thoughts from China. The Chinese Government may also suffer indirect 
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cost by losing support from netizens especially the well-educated middle class in China 
and losing reputation for tightening up censorship on the internet. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the oncoming ‘real name registration’ will not 
substantially change the overall cost-effectiveness of China’s regulation of internet 
contents. 
6 Suggestions and proposal to policy and law makers 
6.1 Suggestions to western policy makers 
6.1.1 Understand the political, social and legal environment in China 
Internet regulation in China is not an independent phenomenon. Rather, it is a part of the 
whole governmental control system. In order to have a better understanding of the 
internet regulation in China and to make ‘proper’ policies addressing the concerns arising 
from China’s internet content regulation, the Western policy makers (especially those of 
the USA) should first understand the unique political, social and legal environments in 
China. 
Law is largely based on and closely connected with politics and this is even more so 
in China. Different governments may have different opinions as to what kinds of 
information are illegal and thus should be prohibited from being published or 
disseminated on the internet or through other types of media. For example, as China 
regards Falun Gong as an illegal organisation threatening the social stability of China, 
any information promoting Falun Gong is deemed illegal and is prohibited. However, 
from a Westerner’s perspectives, Falun Gong may simply be seen as a religious group 
and China’s prohibition of it amounts to a violation of human rights (freedom of 
expression and freedom of religion). A brief study of China’s history may help to 
understand the position of the Chinese Government. In China’s long history, religious 
groups were not uncommonly used as disguises by political organisations aiming to 
overturn the incumbent government.4 It is inappropriate for the US Government to 
provide funds to break through the Chinese Government control over the internet 
contents promoting Falun Gong [Pan, (2006), p.Al 1]. What if China’s Government also 
provides funds and technologies to some Islamic extremist groups to break through the 
FBI’s surveillance over ‘terrorism promotions’? Can the Chinese Government argue that 
the FBI is limiting the human right of freedom of expression/religion? 
6.1.2 Know more about internet users in China 
The Western policy makers should also know more about the internet users in China. 
What are the main purposes of their internet uses? What are the effects of the Chinese 
culture and economic development on the internet users? What are the Chinese citizens’ 
understanding of state sovereignty, state unity and territory integrity, Tibet independence 
movement, China’s territory claim over Taiwan and their views on Falun Gong? Who are 
affected by the content regulation and to what extent? 
It is suggested that Chinese internet users do not rely on their highly-censored internet 
for information or business communication, but instead, primarily for entertainment and 
discussion; and that they do not care too much about the content regulation of the internet 
in China (Thompson, 2006).). This is not, however, the whole picture. In fact, there are a 
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variety of purposes underlying the internet uses in China. However, few of the internet 
users are actually affected by the content regulation to a substantial extent. In China, if 
you are conducting an academic research, you can obtain the information needed online 
and can easily access the US Parliament Library. If you are doing business in China, you 
can access information about almost any stock markets in the World and any other 
business information you need. You can also have a live video conference with your 
overseas business partner by using MSN, Skype, e-mail, and other instant messaging 
software. If you surf the internet for entertainment, you can download music and movies 
as many as you like. And most surprisingly, you can also easily access many 
pornographic materials online without the need of employing any sophisticated computer 
techniques. There has been no real punishment for visiting porn websites in China 
although pornographic contents are said to be prohibited by law (Liao, 2015). Most 
Chinese citizens do not care much about the censorship because they can do almost all 
what they want on the internet (Thompson, 2006). 
In addition, in light of Chinese culture and history, most Chinese people do not really 
care about politics and few of them have sympathy for Falun Gong and its practitioners. 
However, most Chinese people, even those opposing the socialist regime, take for 
granted that Tibet and Taiwan are inalienable parts of China. It seems that only a very 
small fraction of the internet users in China are substantially affected by the content 
regulation, leaving aside the negative effect that the filtering system may lower the 
efficiency of their assess to the desired information, as discussed above. 
On the other hand, with the economic development in China, there are more and more 
“white-collar urban professionals in the major Chinese cities” (Thompson, 2006). They 
do care about political issues and their rights and freedoms. This emerging middle class 
has started to exert their influence over the shaping of the internet regulation policies in 
China. For example, in May 2009, the MIIT informed PC manufacturers that all 
computers sold in China after the stipulated deadline would have to be pre-installed with 
Chinese web-filtering software known as ‘Green Dam’ (VOA, 2009a). A Beijing artist 
proposed a 24-hour internet boycott “to let people know what our attitude is towards this 
kind of censorship” (VOA, 2009b). Eventually the Chinese Government indefinitely 
‘delayed’ the plan in face of the widespread pressure and criticism of the software from 
the public and industrial groups (Id). Up to date, five years after, that plan has not yet 
been actually implemented. Furthermore, the rapid development of mobile network in 
China is turning more and more Chinese citizens into netizens which substantially expand 
internet users (and as stakeholders) beyond ‘middle class’. By the end of June 2014, there 
have been 527 million mobile phone internet users in China (CNNIC, 2014b). Although 
Facebook, YouTube, Twitter cannot be used in China without using effective proxies, 
their ‘equivalents’ such as Renren, Youku, Weibo and WeChat provides Chinese netizens 
with means to share information quickly. Many overseas Chinese also use WeChat who 
shares via ‘groups’ or ‘moment’ all kinds of information with their family members, 
friends and previous classmates and colleagues, which turns more and more Chinese now 
care more about their rights and freedom. Knowing more about the outside world, 
internet users are now braver to resist against government abuse of power. 
6.1.3 Be patient and keep mild but constant efforts 
In the USA, a bill titled ‘Global Online Freedom Act’ was introduced to the House of 
Representatives in 2006, and was reintroduced and referred to the House Energy  
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and Commerce Committee in May 2009 and December 2011 for consideration 
(Govertract.us, 2011). The purpose of the bill was “to prevent United States businesses 
from cooperating with repressive governments in transforming the internet into a tool of 
censorship and surveillance, to fulfil the responsibility of the US Government to promote 
freedom of expression on the internet, to restore public confidence in the integrity of US 
businesses, and for other purposes” (Id). If the bill is passed, many US IT companies 
operating in internet-related business in China will be punished for their compliances 
with the Chinese laws and regulations on internet regulation, or they have to leave the 
Chinese market in order to avoid legal sanctions by the US regulators. It is suggested that 
this bill is seeking to attack the free speech problem in the American way – directly and 
with a ‘big bang’, and not the Chinese way (Smith, 2008). The direct outcome of the 
enactment will be to force the US IT companies to exit the Chinese market rather than to 
exert any meaningful pressure on China to change its policy on regulating the internet 
contents. It is a mistaken belief that China will change its internet regulation policy for 
fear of losing the US companies’ investments and technologies (Id, p.526). The Chinese 
internet market has the capability to exist without US technologies (Id, p.528). The direct 
and ‘big bang’ American way will result in that the US IT companies being forced to 
leave China and losing the opportunity to contribute to expand the freedom of expression 
in China (Id). The fact that Baidu has took over Google’s position in China is a good 
illustration. Chinese people feel more comfortable to accept a mild and gradual change 
than the US law-makers would otherwise indulge themselves in thinking. Therefore, the 
Western policy/law makers must be patient and maintain a positive attitude towards 
internet liberalisation in China if they really care about facilitating Chinese citizen’s 
freedom of expression online. 
6.2 Proposals for Chinese policy/law makers 
In an era of ‘globalisation’, China should be a responsible and reliable member of the 
‘global village’ and should contribute to promote the collective welfare of the 
international community. In relation to its content regulation on the internet, China 
should observe its international obligations and respect the internet architecture. 
6.2.1 Observe China’s international obligations 
China is a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
(United Nations, 2015), article 19(2) of which provides that everyone shall have the right 
to freedom of expression including freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through any media of his choice. 
China has the legal obligation to ensure its citizens’ freedom of expression, including 
the right of access information on the internet without interference and regardless of 
frontiers. It is arguable that some content regulation on the internet by a national 
government is justifiable, for instance, the restriction of child pornography. However, the 
regulation should be put in place for bona fide purposes and in good faith. The 
implementation of the regulation should impair the fundamental human rights as little as 
reasonably necessary. This requires the Chinese Government to narrow the coverage of 
its internet content regulation. The least interference policy will also improve the  
cost-effectiveness of China’s internet regulation. 
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6.2.2 Respect the internet architecture 
As discuss above, the layered architecture of the internet requires national governments 
to respect the layer principle and its two corollaries in internet regulation. The first 
corollary, the principle of layer separation, directs public internet regulators not to violate 
or compromise the separation between layers designed into the basic architecture of the 
internet (Solum and Chung, 2004). The second corollary, the principle of minimising 
layer crossing, directs internet regulators to minimise the distance between the layer at 
which the law aims to produce an effect and the layer directly targeted by legal regulation 
(Id). 
As Liao (2015) shows, Chinese Government adopts a number of measures to enforce 
its law and regulations on internet content control. Different measures have different 
effects and incur different costs. Chinese Government should choose non-layer-violating 
regulation measures as far as it can. For example, policing net café users in the business 
sites and registering their identity, imposing legal liabilities and harsh penalties on 
delinquent internet users to facilitate their self-regulation, and human censorship are 
effective (although costing human resources) and non-layer-violating measures to enforce 
the content control. If cross-layer filtering system is used for certain reasons, the 
government should select those with least interference with the internet layer architecture. 
For example, not to block the IP address if blocking the URL of a specific webpage can 
achieve the regulatory objectives (Solum and Chung, 2004). 
6.3 Proposals for both 
Although there are huge disagreements between the Westerners and the Chinese 
Government as to what should be restricted on the internet, there are still certain contents 
that should be controlled on the internet without too many controversies, for instance, 
child pornography, copyright infringements and materials promoting terrorism. In 
addition, both the West and the Chinese Government have common interests in 
maintaining the transparency of the internet. Therefore, both the western and Chinese 
policy makers should try to achieve mutual understanding and cooperation as a joint 
effort to regulate online activities effectively in those areas, and to preserve the common 
wealth of the human beings – the transparent and layer-structured internet. 
7 Conclusions 
China has the most sophisticated internet regulation regime in the world. A variety of 
laws and regulations were made and a number of levels/measures of law enforcement are 
employed by the Chinese Government in order to regulate the internet contents in China. 
The economic analysis of the internet regulation in China has borrowed economics 
notions to analyse the effects and costs of the regulation. The aim is to find out whether 
China has achieved its goals of the internet regulation and whether its internet content 
regulation is effective and maintainable. It seems that the internet regulation in China has 
achieved, to a large extent, the Chinese Government’s dual goals: to utilise the internet in 
furtherance of its economic growth and to restrict the political impact of the internet, 
despite the huge social costs of regulation incurred by the regulation. The layers analysis 
shows that China’s internet content regulation is not completely effective because of the 
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layer violations. In particular, the technical blocking measures and the centralised 
topology of the internet structure in China are contrary to the fundamental characteristic 
of the internet – the layered architecture. Hence, they are ineffective for both over-
breadth and under-inclusion. They have significant negative effects not only on the 
internet users in China, but also on those in the rest of the world. The analysis also 
suggests that the different law enforcement measures of the internet regulation in China 
have different degrees of interference with the basic architecture of the internet and thus 
have different effects. Measures directly targeting the content layer (e.g., human 
censorship, internet users’ self-censorship) or crossing least layers are more effective and 
have less negative effects. 
Following the economic analysis, it can be said that the internet regulation in China is 
by and large successful in terms of achieving Chinese Government’s policy goals 
notwithstanding the huge direct costs and significant negative effects. Contrary to some 
suggestions, taking into account the unique political, legal and social-cultural 
environment in China, it is submitted that the internet regulation in China is maintainable. 
This is because the contents regulated are becoming increasingly selective in the 
regulation practice and most Chinese citizens can use the internet for their professional 
and personal life and enjoy a level of freedom of expression which would be 
unimaginable a decade ago. The internet-regulation-related incidents that occurred 
recently in China do not herald a substantial change of China’s overall policy on internet 
content regulation. Rather, they could be seen as an application of the Chinese 
Government’s flexible and utilitarian approach in respect of the law enforcement of the 
internet regulation. Proposals are thus made accordingly to the Western and Chinese 
policy and law makers regarding the internet content regulation in China. 
It is very likely that a detailed quantitative research based on empirical data would 
support the submissions by this paper, but this entails another substantive research 
project. 
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Notes 
1 There might also be some ‘positive effects’ that the regulator does not expect but in fact 
benefit the society. 
2 For detail discussions on the comprehensive mechanisms for internet content regulation in 
China, please see Liao (2004). 
3 For detailed discussions on the ‘real name registration’ and its implications,  
please see Liao (2015). 
4 E.g., the Taiping Heaven Movement, the Bailianjiao, among others, in the 19 century seeking 
to overturn the Qing Dynasty. 
